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OVERRIDING THE POSTHUMOUS
APPLICATION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE: DUE PROCESS FOR A CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine the following scenario.' A client tells her attorney in
confidence that she has committed a crime. The client dies before the
Later, the
government begins any prosecution for the crime.
government institutes a criminal prosecution against another person for
the crime at issue. The lawyer for the deceased becomes aware of the
prosecution either because the criminal defendant attempts to call the
lawyer as a witness or through other channels known or unknown to the
defendant. In either case, the lawyer cannot disclose this information
because of a duty of confidentiality to the deceased client,2 and because
of the attorney-client privilege
The above scenario serves as a hypothetical in law school ethics
courses and also occurs in legal practice.4 In practice, the quality of the

1. The idea of a hypothetical as an introduction of this Comment was partly inspired by
an excellent hypothetical in another student written article on this topic. See Brian R. Hood,
Note and Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: PermittingLimited
DisclosureAfter the Death of the Client,7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 741,741-42 (1994).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6 (1998) (hereinafter Model
Rule 1.6).
3. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128
U.S. 464 (1888). The law of every state recognizes a testamentary exception to the attorneyclient privilege. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2085 n.2 (1998).
The Court acknowledged that California is somewhat of an anomaly. See id. California has
codified such a testamentary exception, but, unlike other states, the California "statute is
exceptional in that it apparently allows the attorney to assert the privilege only so long as a
holder of the privilege (the estate's personal representative) exists, suggesting the privilege
terminates when the estate is wound up." Id. (construing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954, 957
(West 1995)). Nationwide, the exception generally allows the personal representative of a
decedent's estate to waive the privilege on behalf of the decedent. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin,
118 S.Ct. at 2085 n.2. This exception is justified on the basis that it furthers the intent of the
decedent-client. See, e.g., id.; Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 406-408 (1897). The fact that an
exception to the attorney-client privilege does exist is obviously important, as is the rationale
behind such an exception. However, this Comment will argue for an override of the attorneyclient privilege in criminal cases, not an exception. See infra,Parts IV through VI.
4. See Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976); New York v. Modzelewski, 611
N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. 1994).
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information expressed by the decedent-client to her attorney may vary.
A client's communication might range from that which will surely
exculpate a current defendant to information that might minimize a
defendant's involvement in a crime. In addition, an attorney might not
know how such a client communication would affect a current
defendant, if at all.' Nonetheless, a criminal defendant may have a
strong interest in the information.6 What is a lawyer to do knowing that
another person faces criminal sanctions, possibly severe ones, for a
crime likely committed by a deceased client? The current answer is that
an attorney is prohibited from disclosing the confession of the deceased
client.7 The question is troubling because it seems fundamentally unfair
that an attorney, as an officer of the court,8 would continue to shield a
deceased client from criminal liability instead of trying to clear a
wrongfully accused defendant by revealing the deceased client's
communication
The attorney-client privilege ceases to prevent a criminal defendant,
or a tribunal on behalf of the defendant, from obtaining exculpatory
information that a lawyer learned from a deceased client. A lawyer
should also have the ethical permission and duty to come forth to share
such information. The thesis of this Comment is that the attorney-client
privilege and the duty of confidentiality succumb to the constitutional
rights of a criminal defendant in such a situation as the hypothetical
one. 10 At the very least, failure by the prosecution to reveal exculpatory
5. See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); South
Carolina v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1981); Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. 2081.
6. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69; Doster,284 S.E.2d at 218; Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct.
at 2081.
7. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086; Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 23; In re John Doe
Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 69; Doster, 284 S.E.2d at 219; Swidler & Berlin, 118
S.Ct. at 2088.

8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCr Preamble(1) (1998).

9. Another author published a better statement to describe what seems wrong about
such a situation:
There is something unsettling about the legal profession's priorities, which allow
attorneys to break the confidence when the client consents, when the client discloses
an intent to commit a crime in the future, or when disclosure is necessary to collect a
fee or to defend oneself against an accusation of wrongful conduct but do not allow
disclosure to protect an innocent person's life.
Julia-Thomas Fishburn, Comment, Attorney-Client Confidences: Punishing the Innocent, 61
U. COLO. L. REv. 185, 202 n.90 (1990).
10. This idea was conceived and suggested by Gregory J. O'Meara, S.J., former
Assistant Visiting Professor at Marquette University Law School.
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evidence in a criminal prosecution violates the due process requirements
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' More specifically, it is a
violation of the Brady doctrine" for a prosecutor to fail to reveal
information that "is material either to guilt or to punishment.""
This Comment will argue that it is a Brady violation for a prosecutor
to prevent a defendant from either learning of information gained by an
attorney from a now-deceased client or by objecting to such testimony
in court. Moreover, a court also commits a Brady violation by refusing
to admit such testimony as evidence or by refusing to compel such
testimony by a lawyer. Such an argument includes an expansive view of
the Brady doctrine, extending the doctrine beyond the mere suppression
of evidence to include the courtroom and the prevention of evidence
from entering a criminal proceeding.
In addition, to ensure that an attorney has guidance in such a
situation, Model Rule 1.6 should require that a lawyer make such a
disclosure if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such
information could "potentially exculpate" 4 a criminal defendant.
Part II to follow discusses the United States Supreme Court's most
recent examination of the posthumous application of the attorney-client
III examines cases that demonstrate the need for an
privilege. Part
"overrid[e]"' 5 of the attorney-client privilege and a modification to
Model Rule 1.6. Then, Part IV explores cases that should allow a
criminal defendant to invoke his or her due process rights to overcome
the prohibition of disclosure by a lawyer who is either prevented from or
unwilling to disclose client confidences based on the posthumous
application of the attorney-client privilege. Last, the intersection
between posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, the
Fifth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant, and the Model Rule
1.6 duty of confidentiality will be examined in Part V.
II. EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S RECENT
INQUIRY INTO THE POSTHUMOUS APPLICATION OF THE PRIVILEGE

The United States Supreme Court has not granted a writ of
certiorari to a case that frames the issues as the hypothetical above does.
11. U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV.
12. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13. Id.at 87.

14. Hood, supra note 1, at 778-79.
15. In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 69 (Mass. 1990). The use of
the term "overrid[e]" throughout this Comment can be traced to John Doe.
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However, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States,6 the Court decided that
the attorney-client privilege survives the death of a client.17 The facts of
the case did not implicate the due process concerns of a particular
criminal defendant in the manner that the hypothetical above does.'8
Swidler & Berlin reached the Court as a result of an investigation into
"the 1993 dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office.
Vincent W. Foster, Jr., was Deputy White House Counsel when the
firings occurred."' 9 After the firings, Foster met with James Hamilton, a
lawyer with the law firm of Swidler & Berlin." Subsequently, Foster
committed suicide.2 The Office of the Independent Counsel, while
investigating the White House Travel Office, urged a grand jury to issue
subpoenas for the notes of the meeting between Foster and Hamilton. '
The grand jury issued the subpoenas, but Hamilton and his firm refused
to comply with them.2' Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin relied on the
attorney-client privilege in their refusal.24 The firm and Hamilton filed a
motion to quash the indictments in federal district court. The court
granted the motion based on the attorney-client privilege and the work
product privilege.26
The Office of the Independent Counsel appealed the district court
ruling. 7 In Sealed Case, the court of appeals reversed the ruling.2 The
court, instead of relying on precedent, used Federal Rule of Evidence
50129 as a means to fashion a rule that applied differently in criminal

16. 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998).
17. See id. at 2088.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 2083.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 2083.
24. See id. Swidler & Berlin and James Hamilton also asserted the work product
privilege to protect the information. The Court never reached the question of work product
privilege because it decided that the communications were protected by the attorney-client
privilege. See id. at 2084. Like the Court, this Comment will focus solely on the attorneyclient privilege. The additional analysis of work product privilege, though potentially
implicated by the hypothetical above, is an additional step beyond the scope of this
Comment.
25. See id. at 2083.
26. See id.
27. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28. See id. at 237.
29. FED. R. EVID. 501 (hereinafter referred to as Rule 501).
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cases than civil disputes. 3 The court created an exception to the
attorney-client privilege "within the discrete zone of criminal
litigation.",31 Sealed Case developed a balancing test in which a judge
would review confidential information in camera, balancing the
decedent's continued confidentiality interest versus the need for the
information in a criminal matter.32 The test required at a minimum that
the information be of "substantial, 33 importance to the criminal
proceeding. In addition to framing a test contrary to other decisions on
the privilege after client death, the parties to Sealed Case and the court
itself also properly framed the arguments for cessation of the privilege
after client death.'
Sealed Case dispelled the strongest arguments against continuation
of the privilege posthumously. Those arguments include the following:
reputational interests after death, civil liability of the decedent-client's
estate, and the encouragement of communication between client and
lawyer.35 The court relied on secondary sources in determining that the
needs of a criminal proceeding may sometimes outweigh the three
arguments in support of posthumous application of the privilege.3 Thus,
the court remanded to the district court to "reexamine the documents in
light" 37 of the new balancing test. Swidler & Berlin and James Hamilton
appealed to the nation's high Court.
The Office of the Independent Counsel favored the balancing
approach in criminal proceedings designed by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals.3 The Independent Counsel offered a number of reasons why
a balancing approach should be adopted. The Independent Counsel
tried to use the widely accepted testamentary exception to the attorney30. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 234.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 235.
34. See id. at 232-37. Sealed Case did properly analyze concerns of civil liability,
reputation, and the encouragement of communication with an attorney. See id. However, the
court used Rule 501 to develop a new law of evidence. See id.; FED. R. EVID. 501. This
Comment will argue that the way to properly permit a criminal defendant to achieve access to
information is not through a new exception to the attorney-client privilege, a law of evidence.
Rather, the better way to gain access is by overriding the attorney-client privilege in the name
of constitutional due process.
35. See Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 231-35.
36. See id. at 233 (relying on several commentators and the tentative Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 127 (1996) to conclude that a balancing test would
be appropriate in criminal cases).
37. Id. at 237.
38. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081,2087 (1998).
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client privilege to carve out another
proceedings.39 He argued that

exception

for

criminal

the [testamentary] exception reflects a policy judgment that the
interest in settling estates outweighs any posthumous interest in
confidentiality. He then reason[ed] by analogy that in criminal
proceedings, the interest in determining whether a crime has
been committed should trump client confidentiality, particularly
4
since the financial interests of the estate are not at stake. 0
The Court, however, did not accept the argument because "cases
consistently recognize that the rationale for the testamentary exception
is that it furthers the client's intent ....
The Independent Counsel
also urged that the "proposed exception would have minimal impact if
confined to criminal cases . . 4' The Court rejected this argument for
two reasons. No precedent existed to justify a distinction between civil
and criminal cases. 43 Also, "a client may not know at the time that he
discloses information to his attorney whether it will later be relevant to a
civil or criminal matter... ."4 The Court also rejected the contention
that the existence of another exception to the privilege would have a
"marginal" impact. 4' The current exceptions furthered the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege while the proposed exception "appear[ed]
at odds with the goals of encouraging full and frank communication and
of protecting the client's interests."" The Court's consistent refusal of
the Independent Counsel's arguments demonstrated its unwillingness to
create another exception to the privilege. 4
Swidler & Berlin does not square directly with the hypothetical
posed above. 48 The case, however, fleshed out many of the issues that
are pertinent to the analysis of postmortem application of the attorneyclient privilege.49 Swidler & Berlin, therefore, is important to any

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 2085.
Id.
Id. at 2086.
Id. at 2087.
See id.

Id.
Id. at 2087.
Id. at 2087.
See id. at 2085-88.
Id. at 2081.
See id. at 2085-88.
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discussion of posthumous application of attorney-client privilege
because it indicates the current Court's feelings about the privilege. The
Court refused to welcome an exception to the privilege based on a
distinction between civil and criminal cases.' It is that very distinction
that this Comment will rely on for compelling and permitting the
disclosure of client confidences after death. While the facts of the
hypothetical above and the Swidler & Berlin case are fundamentally
different, the case did shed some light on when or if the United States
Supreme Court will permit or compel the disclosure of privileged
information of a decedent-client. 1 Next, Part III will examine cases that
generate the need for disclosure of privileged information after the
death of a client.
III. THE OCCASIONAL OVERWHELMING NEED OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS TO ACCESS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION

The hypothetical above occurs in practice, not just law school ethics
courses. A decedent-client either confesses to a crime now charged to

another person, or alternatively, shares other exculpatory information
about another person now charged with that crime." The following
cases illustrate the substantial injustice that can occur when one of the

following situations occurs: (1) an attorney who is willing to testify about
a decedent-client's shared confidence is precluded from doing so, or (2)

an attorney is unwilling to testify about a decedent-client's shared
confidence and a court is unwilling to compel such testimony. 3
50. See id. at 2086-87.
51. See id. at 2087 n.3 (noting that Swidler & Berlin and James Hamilton conceded that
"implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights might warrant breaching the
privilege"); see also id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting the same concession).
52 See Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976); In re John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); New York v. Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y.
1994). The cases mentioned here mirror the posed hypothetical substantially. However, one
also can imagine other scenarios in which a decedent-client shares information that could
exculpate another, but the information does not rise to the level of a confession. Such a
situation does not pose that different of a question from a confession scenario. The attorneyclient privilege would still operate and the criminal defendant or suspect would still want the
information. The only distinction may be that the accused may have a somewhat lesser desire
to obtain the information and a tribunal or the attorney for the deceased may regard the
exculpatory information as somewhat more 'shareable.'
53. Cases have been decided both ways. CompareMacumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (precluding
two willing attorneys from testifying about a deceased client's confession), with John Doe, 562
N.E.2d 69 (refusing to compel an unwilling attorney to testify about a deceased client's
meeting with the attorney shortly before the client's suicide), and Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct.
2081 (refusing to compel an unwilling attorney to testify about a deceased client's meeting
with the attorney shortly before the client's suicide).
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A. Counsel Willing to Testify that a Deceased Client Confessed to the

Crime Charged
In Arizona v.

Macumber,M

the state convicted the defendant "of two

counts of first-degree murder."55 Macumber appealed on the basis that,
among other things, the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of
two attorneys. 6 The attorneys were prepared to testify at Macumber's

trial "that another individual had confessed to the crime for which
Macumber was being tried. 57 At the time, Arizona had codified the
attorney-client privilege. 8 The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that the
statute automatically barred the attorneys' potentially exculpatory
testimony. 9

Justice Holohan of the Supreme Court of Arizona filed a specially
concurring opinion in Macumber. He argued that the court should not

automatically bar an attorney from testifying that a decedent-client
confessed to a crime now charged to another for two reasons. First, he
relied on the United State Supreme Court's decree in Chambers v.
Mississippi6' that "[a] state's rule of evidence cannot deny an accused's
right to present a proper defense."62 Chambers "ruled that it is a
violation of due process for a state rule of evidence to preclude the

admission of reliable hearsay declarations against penal interest when6
such evidence is offered to show the innocence of the accused."
Second, an argument based on a more general consideration of due
54. 544 P.2d 1084 (1976).
55. Id. at 1085.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1086.
58. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(2) (West 1989) (renumbered by 1977 Ariz.
Sess. Laws Ch. 142, § 165).
59. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086. The court did overturn Macumber's conviction on
other grounds. See id. On remand, the trial court held a hearing to determine the validity of
the attorneys' testimony, despite the plain opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona to the
contrary. See Macumber v. Arizona, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1976). The trial court found the
attorneys' testimony lacking in memory of details sufficient to allow their testimony. See id.
at 166-167. Presumably, if either of the attorneys had testified the government could have
won an appeal based on the rule developed in the first Macumber opinion. See Macumber,
544 P.2d at 1086 (ruling that the attorney-client privilege absolutely survives the death of the
client in non-testamentary cases).
60. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1087 (Holohan, J., specially concurring).
61. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
62. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring) (construing the
ruling in Chambers, 410 U.S. 284).
63. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., specially concurring) (explaining the rule
developed in Chambers).
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process was made.' Due process considerations "should prevail over
the property interest of a deceased client in keeping his disclosures
private."' " The majority, according to the concurrence, failed to
properly consider that the Macumber facts required a weighing of the
The two arguments offered by the Holohan
interests involved.'
concurrence partly inspired this Comment's point to follow - that the
due process requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments has
the ability to supercede the posthumous application of the attorney-

client privilege.67
B. A Court Unwilling to Compel an Attorney to Testify

In a well-publicized case involving facts similar to the posed
hypothetical, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that
the attorney-client privilege absolutely survives the death of a client.'
In late 1989 Charles Stuart allegedly shot and killed his pregnant wife,
Carol DiMaiti Staurt." Initially, Charles Stuart told police that "a
robber entered his car at a red light... [and] shot his wife in the head
and then shot him in the abdomen before fleeing with their jewelry."7
"[T]he police investigation focused on a paroled convict whom Charles
picked out of a police lineup .... "'

Later, Charles' brother Matthew Stuart went to police with a
Matthew admitted that he was an unknowing
different story.'
accomplice in an insurance-scam murder of Carol and the Stuart's
unborn child.73 Matthew alleged that Charles planned the murders to
get insurance money for valuables lost in a staged robbery.74 However,
64. See Macumber,544 P.2d at 1088.
65. Id.
66. See id.

67. See infra, Part IV through VI (discussing the Fifth Amendment and its effect on the
attorney-client privilege in non-client criminal proceedings after client death).
68. See In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
69. See Frances M. Jewels, Case Comment, Evidence-Attorney-ClientPrivilege Survives
Death-In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 408 Mass. 480, 562 N.E.2d 69 (1990), 25

SUFFOLK U. L. REV 1260, 1260-62 (1991) (telling the story behind John Doe, but not alleging
that Stuart killed his wife and child). Jewels' article provides a succinct and fair assessment of
the facts of John Doe. The author relies on newspaper accounts from the Boston Globe to
relay the facts of the case. The published opinion of John Doe does not contain an extensive
account of the facts leading to the litigation. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69-73.
70. Jewels, supra note 69, at 1260.
71. Id. at 1261 n.15.
72- See id. at 1260-61.
73. See id. at 1260-61 & nn.8-12.
74. See id.
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Matthew said that he unknowingly helped his brother commit murder
because he agreed to meet Charles at a pre-disclosed location without
prior knowledge of the planned murder.' On the day that Matthew
went to the police, Charles met with an attorney, John T. Dawley." The
following day Charles died when he fell from a bridge, allegedly by
choice.'
Massachusetts prosecutors "sought Dawley's testimony concerning
the substance of Charles' statements at their [Dawley's and Charles'] ...
meeting. '
Until the time that Matthew went to the police, the
investigation centered on the man Charles had fingered for the crimes.79
Once Matthew revealed his story, however, "the police believed Charles
was 'most likely guilty' of murdering his wife [and child]."'
Nevertheless, a grand jury investigated "whether Matthew was more
than an unwitting accomplice to the murder[s]."'" The attorney,
Dawley, refused to testify before the grand jury based on Charles'
attorney-client privilege." "Subsequently, the commonwealth filed a
motion requesting the court override the privilege, arguing that society's
interest in ascertaining the truth concerning Carol's death and in
identifying the parties responsible outweighed the value protected by
the privilege. ' '83
The trial court "reported to the Appeals Court the question
whether, in the circumstances of this case, the attorney-client privilege
should be overridden."" The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
ordered that the case skip the intermediate appellate court and pass
The Commonwealth of
immediately for its consideration. 8'
Massachusetts had only one case, Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 6 and
75. See id.
76. See id. at 1261 & n.13.
77. See id. at 1261 & n.14.
78. Id. at 1261.

79. See id. at 1261 n.15.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. (quoting Boston Globe, Jan. 5 1990, at 1).
Id.
See id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1262 (footnote omitted).
In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 69 (Mass. 1990).

85. See id. at 69.
86. 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976). Cohen was a personal injury action in which the
plaintiff was struck by a taxi. See id. Subsequently, the driver of the cab died, but before his
death he told his attorney that he was the driver in the accident at issue. See id. The plaintiff
attempted only to sue the driver's employer, not the deceased driver's estate. See id. The
plaintiff wanted to compel the testimony of the driver's attorney for the purpose of
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no statutory basis to rely on in its bid to "overrid[e] ' the privilege.'
The court in John Doe refused to rely on the rationale of Cohen.8 First,
the decision in Cohen was an anomaly; no other decision like it could be
found and the case was from an intermediate appellate court in another
state.90 Second, the court declared that the survival of the attorneyclient privilege was so well settled that it could not possibly
"overrid[e]"'" the privilege like the Cohen court did.' More generally,
"the Commonwealth argued that the interests of justice require[d] that
the privilege be overridden."
The court did not accept the
Commonwealth's policy argument.? According to the court, the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage communication
between attorney and client.' To allow disclosure, even posthumously,
would impair communication between attorney and client. The court
looked as far back as 1833 when, in Hatton v. Robinson,97 it declared that
information shared by a client with an attorney is "for ever sealed" from
disclosure by the attorney.'
In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation99 is not exactly like the
hypothetical above, but it is substantially similar. There are two
meaningful differences, however. First, in John Doe, the governmentnot the criminal defendant-sought the information in a grand jury
identifying the driver and his employer as the cause of injury. See id. The Pennsylvania court
decided that "when it is shown that the interests of the administration of justice can only be
frustrated by the exercise of the privilege, the trial judge may require that the communication
be disclosed." Id. at 694 (citation omitted). The court developed a test that considered: (1)
the impact the disclosure would have on the client's daily affairs, rights, and interests, (2)
potential civil liability for the decedent's estate, and (3) whether the information would harm
the reputation of the deceased. See itat 693-94.
87. John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 70.
88. See i& at 70-72.
89. See id. at 71.
90. See id
91. Id. at 70.
92. See id.
at 71.
93. Id. at 69.
94. See id.
at 69-72.
95. See id.
at 70-71.
96. See id.
97. 14 Pick. 416 (Mass. 1833). The court also relied on Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464
(1888). See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 70. Hunt is the case that courts often rely on to show
that the absoluteness of the attorney-client privilege is a long-standing principle in American
law. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
98. Hatton, 14 Pick. at 422.
99. 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
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investigation.'l° Second, the government probably did not regard
Matthew Stuart as the main perpetrator.' 1 The government was
investigating Matthew Stuart in a criminal proceeding about whom a
lawyer holding privileged information from a deceased client likely had
information. The lawyer likely held information that could have had a
substantial impact on the penal interests of Matthew Stuart. The
attorney, however, was unwilling to share the confidence learned from
the decedent-client. Thus, although Macumber'° better fits the model

posed by the hypothetical, John Doe' 3 also serves as an example of the
type of case that evokes substantially similar issues.
C. Convergence of the Cases Above
There are few published cases involving facts like the hypothetical
and Macumber.'° However, when such a scenario arises, the need of a
criminal defendant like Macumber for such information is
overwhelming. Reported cases in the United States do not offer an
answer as to how a person like Macumber can gain access to privileged
information.'5 The policy argument in John Doe failed.'06 The
argument in Macumber failed due to solid state precedent and a statute
codifying the attorney-client privilege.' The defendant in Macumber
also failed to win a policy argument, similar to the policy argument in
John Doe."° The Independent Counsel enjoyed only temporary success
100. In this way then John Doe is similar to Swidler & Berlin. Compare John Doe, 562
N.E.2d 69 (precluding prosecutors from obtaining information for a grand jury investigation),
with Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (precluding the Office of the Independent Counsel from
obtaining information for a grand jury proceeding). The facts of either case are not exactly
like the posed hypothetical. However, both cases had the potential for implicating the due
process rights of a criminal defendant. Both also evoke similar issues to cases involving
confessions. But cf Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (barring the testimony
of two attorneys prepared to testify about a decedent-client's confession); New York v.
Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (barring the testimony of an attorney of
a dead client about a coperpetrator's confession).
101. See Jewels, supra note 69, at 1261 n.15.
102. Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976).
103. John Doe, 562 N.E.2d 69.
104. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084; Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d 22.
105. See Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. 2081; John Doe, 562 N.E.2d 69; Macumber,544 P.2d
1084; Modzelewski, 611 N.Y.S.2d 22; South Carolina v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1981).
106. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69-72. The dissent in John Doe embraced the policy
reasoning and proposed that the court should have developed a rule like that in Cohen v.
Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692-94. See John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 72-73 (Nolan, J.,
dissenting).
107. See Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086-87.
108. Id.
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when the court of appeals used its power under Rule 501'" to fashion a
balancing test."0 The court in Sealed Case embraced the policy behind
such an exception when it went to great lengths to refute the policy
arguments in favor of posthumous application of the privilege."' 2
However, the Independent Counsel's arguments in Swidler & Berlin
failed for a variety of reasons. First, the analogy to the testamentary
exception suffered from the proposed exception's inability to act as
other exceptions do."' Second, the Court did not accept the argument
that the effect of a new exception would be "marginal.""14 Third, despite

an effort to solidify the policy arguments in favor of an exception
through a diverse set of legal arguments, the Court would not welcome
the same policy reasoning rejected in Macumber and John Doe. 5 Last,
the Independent Counsel could not convince the Court to distinguish
between civil and criminal cases."6
The Swidler & Berlin Court acknowledged that a situation so grave,
involving the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, might permit
disclosure of such privileged information."' The Court left at least two
questions unanswered. First, what type of fact pattern involving what
constitutional rights will permit such a disclosure of privileged
information? Second, under what theory will a criminal defendant or a
prosecutor argue in order to access such privileged information? One of
the implications of the hypothetical above is the due process rights of a
criminal defendant. The next section will explore a line of cases that
prohibits the government from withholding exculpatory information
from a criminal trial. Part IV proposes that this line of cases requires
client if
disclosure by a lawyer holding privileged information of a dead
58
punishment.""
to
or
guilt
to
either
material
"is
information
the

109. FED. R. EvID. 501.
110. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir 1997).
111. See id. at 231-237.
112. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998).
113. See id. at 2085-86.
114. Id. at 2087.
115. See id. at 2084-88.
116. See id. at 2087.
117. See id at 2087 n.3. The entire footnote reads as follows: "Petitioner [James
Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin], while opposing wholesale abrogation of the privilege in
criminal cases, concedes that exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights might warrant breaching this privilege. We do not, however, need to
reach this issue, since such exceptional circumstances clearly are not present here." Id.
118. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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IV. DUTY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EXCULPATORY
INFORMATION

A. ConstitutionalArguments

A variety of different sources have maintained that the
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant can be violated in situations
like the hypothetical and Macumber. The Macumber concurrence based
its assertion on Chambers v. Mississippi,"9 which declared that a "it is a
violation of due process for a state rule of evidence to preclude the
admission of reliable hearsay declarations against penal interest when
such evidence is offered to show the innocence of the accused."'"
Another constitutional contention states that the Sixth
Amendment1 21 can be violated in such a situation. The argument relies
on the requirement that, according to the Sixth Amendment, "'[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be
confronted with the witnesses against him... [and] to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... ,,,1 The proponent of
this argument went even a step further by arguing that the Sixth
Amendment ought to require disclosure even while the client is living.'"
However, because the concept of the privilege is so entrenched in
American law,' 24 it seems unlikely that any state or federal law or rule of
attorney conduct would ever permit such a disclosure based on the Sixth
Amendment while the client is alive.' z' However, the thesis of this
Comment is an alternative argument to the strong Sixth Amendment
argument in favor of posthumous disclosure.
In Swidler & Berlin, the Independent Counsel tried to gain a new
"exception" to the attorney-client privilege, but failed.'
The
Independent Counsel, however, did not frame his argument in
constitutional parameters. 27 Instead, he argued that the Court should
make a new exception based on its powers under Rule 501."
119. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
120. Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1088 (1976).
121. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
122. Thomas-Fishburn, supranote 9, at 200 (quoting the Sixth Amendment).
123. See id. at 200-201.
124. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998); Upjohn Co. v.
United Sates, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
125. See Thomas-Fishburn, supra note 9, at 200.
126. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S.Ct. 2084.
127. See id. at 2083-88.
128. See id. at 2085-88.
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Nonetheless, Swidler & Berlin did open the door to future consideration
by the United States Supreme Court that the constitutional rights of a
criminal defendant may require "breaching the privilege., 129 The Court,
however, did not offer any avenue by which a criminal defendant may
achieve a "breach" of the privilege.'O This section will explore what
may be a criminal defendant's best chance of achieving such a
"breach.""'
B. Brady to Kyles: A Defendant's Right to Exculpatory Information
The United States Supreme Court has developed a system of rules to
protect the due process rights of a criminal defendant when the
Through four
prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence.
significant cases, the Court has outlined the duties imposed on the
government when the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence.
In Brady v. Maryland, 2 the Court held that "suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates
due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the4
prosecution.'' Brady and a co-perpetrator were convicted of murder.'
Brady conceded that he participated in the crime, but he claimed that
the companion did the actual killing.'35 He confessed only to avoid the
Brady "requested the prosecution to allow him to
death penalty.3
examine one of [the companion's] extrajudicial statements."'37 The
prosecutor complied with Brady's request except for one statement by
his companion." In that statement, the companion "admitted the actual
homicide."'3 9 The Court found that "the suppression of this confession
was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'4' The Brady Court found that "[a] prosecution that
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available,

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 2087 n.3.
Id.
Id.
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
See id. at 84.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 86.
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would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial
that bears heavily on the defendant. 14' The analogy that this Comment
makes is that to withhold exculpatory information from a criminal
defendant is like prohibiting an attorney or failing to compel an attorney
from testifying about exculpatory information that a decedent-client has
provided.'42 First, however, the Court's additions to the Brady doctrine
must be examined.
In United States v. Agurs'43, the Court lessened the burden on the
criminal defendant in Brady situations.'" Agurs was convicted of
second-degree murder in a stabbing death.4 ' She defended herself46
solely on the basis that she acted in self-defense in killing the victim.'
The defendant failed to request a copy of the victim's criminal record
before and during the trial.'47 Three months after trial she moved for a
new trial.'" The defendant contended "(1) that [the victim] had a prior
criminal record that would have further evidenced his violent
character... [and] (2) that the prosecutor had failed to disclose this
information to the defense ....
,14'The victim did have a criminal
record involving knife crime.'" The Court decided that the government
might have a duty to disclose exculpatory information even when a
defendant does not request it. 5' In order to avoid constitutional error
when a defendant has not made a specific request for an item, Agurs
required that the government disclose information if it would create "a
reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist ... .

The two cases

to follow developed more extensively the duty of disclosure that the
government must follow.
In United States v. Bagley,'53 the Court modified the standard
developed in Brady and Agurs. The defendant was charged with
141. Id. at 87-88.
142. Whether the prosecutor argues against the testimony of a willing attorney or a
judge refuses to compel the testimony of an unwilling attorney, the government would still be
acting in violation of the due process rights of the criminal defendant.
143. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
144. See id. at 103-14.
145. See id. at 98.
146. See id. at 100.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 100-01.
151. See id. at 108-14.
152- Id. at 112.
153. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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"violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes."''M Bagley requested
the names of any witnesses with whom the government made any deals
with in exchange for their testimony.55 The government failed to reveal
that it had paid two private security officers for their assistance in
investigating the defendant and testifying against him at his trial.'56 The
Court used this case to develop a new materiality standard of mandatory
disclosure. Borrowing its own standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel jurisprudence," 7 the Court declared that "evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."'"5 Thus, Bagley expanded the
bounds of what the government must share with a criminal defendant.
The new materiality standard enabled a defendant to better argue a
Brady violation because of that extensive burden on the government.
According to Kyles v. Whitley,"9 the next case in this line of
exculpatory evidence cases, "[f]our aspects of materiality under Bagley
bear emphasis."' ' First, the defendant only needs to show that, absent
the suppressed evidence, he did not "receiv[e] a fair trial, understood as
a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.' 16'

The defendant

does not need to show that if the government had made the evidence
available he would have been acquitted, only that the trial would have
been different. 62 Second, Kyles recognized that Bagley materiality does
not require the defendant show that, "after discounting the inculpatory
evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been
enough left to convict."' 6' Third, a violation of Bagley materiality, by
definition, can never be harmless.'6M To violate Bagley materiality means
that confidence in the outcome has been undermined.'65 Fourth, Bagley
materiality is defined "in terms of suppressed evidence considered

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 669.
See idL
See iiL at 671-72.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Id. at 434.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 434-35.
See id. at 435.
See id.
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collectively, not item by item." ' 66 In addition to modifying the
materiality standard, Bagley also eliminated a number of distinctions
based on (1) whether or not the defendant requested the information
and (2) with what specificity the defendant made such requests.' 67
Kyles v. Whitley'6 is the final significant case in this course of
jurisprudence. First, Kyles effectively affirmed and outlined the Bagley
materiality standard.'69 Second, the Court demonstrated its willingness
to conduct a fact-intensive approach to ensuring that suppressed
exculpatory evidence did not undermine the due process requirements
of a criminal proceeding.' The facts of Kyles are complex. 17' A concise
version of them is appropriate, however. Kyles was convicted of firstdegree murder in Louisiana." An informant notified police that Kyles
had committed a murder already known to the police." The informant
told police and prosecutors a variety of different versions about events
relating to the crime." 4 The informant, an acquaintance of Kyles', could
himself have been a suspect in the murder. 5 Prosecutors withheld from
Kyles' certain conflicting statements made by the informant and
conflicting eyewitness reports about the identity of the killer.7 6 The
United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction based on Brady.'"
The Court also ruled that a prosecutor is responsible for knowing all
exculpatory information that the government has in a case, even if the
police, as government actors, fail to pass the information on to the
prosecutor.7 8 The rationale behind such a rule is that "'procedures and
regulations can be established to carry [the prosecutor's burden] and to
insure communication of all relevant information... .,,,17 Thus, Kyles
continued the Court's defendant-favorable approach to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence known by the government.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 436.
See Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82.
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
See id. at 434-36.
See id. at 421-34.
See id.
See id. at 422.
See id. at 424.
See id. at 424-30.
See id. at 430.
See id. at 441-45.
See id. at 421-22.
See id. at 438.
Id. at 438 (citation omitted).
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V. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN DUE PROCESS, PRIVILEGE, AND
CONFIDENTIALITY

In 1994, a law student argued persuasively for a revised Rule 1.6 that
would permit a lawyer to reveal information gained from a client "to
potentially exculpate a criminal defendant whom the lawyer has reason
to believe is innocent based upon information the lawyer knows about a
client who has subsequently died.""' The author based his argument on
the proposed revision being consistent with "confidentiality's
[underlying] purpose of furthering justice. 18' However, unless the
American Bar Association changes Rule 1.6 and the law of privilege
follows suit in recognizing the exception, the argument will fail in court.
The Swidler & Berlin Court showed that it was not eager to create a new
exception to the privilege."2 Swidler & Berlin also refused to accept a
distinction based on whether a matter was civil or criminal." What then
will it take for a criminal defendant to gain access to the privileged
information held by an attorney for a deceased client? The case will
have to have the right facts - a situation rivaling Macumber or the
hypothetical above, probably not John Doe or Swidler. The best
scenario would involve an outright confession by the decedent and made
only to the attorney. Add a prosecutor and a court unwilling to let the
attorney testify, and the best case is born.
The theory upon which a defendant must argue such a case must be
based upon constitutional grounds. The majority of the Swidler &
Berlin Court acted entirely uninterested in creating a new exception to
the attorney-client privilege under Rule 501.84 Thus, such a defendant
must look for another theory to access the information. The cases from
Brady to Kyles offer such an avenue. Those cases consistently recognize
that if the government, acting through the prosecutor, fails to share
exculpatory information with a criminal defendant a violation of due
process occurs.'s6 If the information is material to guilt or punishment
the defendant must receive the information from the government,
regardless of whether he or she requests it. 6 While the client is alive,
his or her due process concerns still exist and an override of the
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Hood, supranote 1, at 779.
Id. at 780.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998).
Id. at 2087.
See id.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433-37 (1995).
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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privilege cannot occur based on the due process concerns of client
confidentiality and privilege. Once the client dies, however, the due
process rights in the privilege cease to exist. It should then be a
violation of the non-client criminal defendant's due process rights if a
prosecutor moves to prohibit the testimony of an attorney willing to
testify that a deceased client shared information that would exculpate
the current defendant. Just like in Brady situations, a prosecutor
withholds exculpatory information from a criminal proceeding by
contesting such testimony. Such an act by a prosecutor is also like a
typical Brady situation because it is an effort to preclude a defendant
from presenting a complete argument to a fact-finder. In Brady
scenarios, courts call it a violation of due process and say that
confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined. So long as the
information that an attorney would have supplied satisfies the Bagley
materiality test, the unwillingness of a prosecutor, acting as a
government agent, must be regarded as a violation of due process as
well.
A court that is unwilling to compel the testimony of an attorney who
has learned of exculpatory information from a deceased client can also
violate the due process concerns of a criminal defendant. If a court is
willing to enforce a law of evidence, the attorney-client privilege, instead
of protecting the due process rights of a criminal defendant, a
constitutional violation has occurred. In Chambers, the United States
Supreme Court declared that a rule of evidence cannot deny a
defendant's right to due process in a criminal proceeding. ' 8 Despite
basing its holding in the Sixth Amendment,"8 the Court still accepted an
argument based on due process to override"9 an evidentiary rule. If a
Brady violation occurs when the government, including both
prosecutors and courts, refuses to accept exculpatory evidence, then a
court cannot enforce the attorney-client privilege for a deceased client.
The due process concerns of client confidentiality during the client's life
will enable a judge to enforce the privilege. After death, however, that
is no longer the case. As mentioned previously, the due process
concerns of a client seek to exist after death. Thus, the due process
187. See id.
188. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
189. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
190. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation,
562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990) asked for an 'override' of the attorney-client privilege. It is used
somewhat differently in the discussion here because of the argument's constitutional
grounding as opposed to John Doe's grounding in the interests of justice. See id.
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rights of the current criminal defendant override continuation of the
attorney-client privilege.
In Sealed Case and Swidler & Berlin, James Hamilton and his law
firm exposed and relied on the rationale behind posthumous application
of the privilege."' The concerns for the deceased client's reputation and
civil liability remain even after death. In addition, society's interest in
encouraging communication between lawyer and client is a strong
reason for continuation of the privilege after death. When others have
argued for an exception to the privilege they faced those strong
arguments and lost, except for the anomaly of Cohen.'9 A case based on
a Brady violation, a foul against constitutional due process, does not
face those arguments in the same way. Asking for a new rule of
evidence, an exception to the attorney-client privilege, is a much
different, and more burdensome, task than asking a court to enforce the
already existing constitutional standards of Brady and its subsidiary
cases. The rationale behind the privilege, therefore, becomes a less
meaningful consideration in a due process analysis.
After losing out to the due process rights of a criminal defendant,
concerns for reputation and civil liability still remain as a practical
matter. First, as to reputation, does a decedent really deserve a good
reputation if she has committed a crime that another is being prosecuted
for? Second, as to civil liability, in most cases involving these types of
fact situations there is probably no sizeable estate that will suffer civil
reduction. If there is an estate of measurable size is it not more
important that the victim of a crime receive restitution before the heirs
of an estate enjoy their inheritance?
Finally, encouragement of communication between lawyer and
attorney remains a concern. First, the due process concerns of a
criminal defendant should trump our concern for such encouragement.
Nonetheless, this concern could at least be resolved by the modification
to Rule 1.6 posed above.' 9 That is, Rule 1.6 should allow an attorney to
share information "to potentially exculpate a criminal defendant whom
the lawyer has reason to believe is innocent based upon information the
lawyer knows about a client who has subsequently died."' 14 Surely, if
clients were advised that only when they died and only in the rarest of
191. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232-35 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081 (1998).
192. Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
193. See Hood, supra note 1, at 779 and text accompanying note 180.
194. Hood, supra note 1, at 779.
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circumstances could their communication possibly be shared, they
would regard the posthumous cessation of the privilege as trivial. 95
VI. CONCLUSION
The attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality serve
valid and useful purposes. The facts of some cases are so compelling,
however, that a criminal defendant must be allowed to access otherwise
privileged exculpatory information and offer such information as
evidence in court. Under the current law of the privilege, a new
exception does not offer an opportunity to access such information.
However, if a defendant can utilize the teachings of Brady, Agurs,
Bagley, and Kyles she may have a chance to override the privilege by
asserting her constitutional right to exculpatory information in a
criminal proceeding. If either the prosecutor or the court will not
comply with the defendant's request, the defendant can allege a Brady
violation of her due process rights.
TYSON A. CIEPLUCH
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